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ABSTRACT
International law obliges states to respect their obligations in accordance with the
principle of pacta sunt servanda unless the obligation is odious. Citizens of any state
should depend on state practice and judicial precedent to repudiate obligation that
originated odiously. Jurisprudential and legal controversy arose about the extent of the
state’s commitment with debt arising from those obligations. Jurisprudence and the
judiciary tried to set a definition of odious debt since the eighteenth century. The
difficulty of the definition arises in determining when and how debt is odious, and what
are the criteria of odious debt. Another difficulty arises in finding sources of international
law to cancel and reject such debt. This paper will be primarily concerned with
identifying the precise definition of and normative basis for the doctrine of odious debt in
international law. It also concerned with the international legal standards that states can
rely on to get rid of that debt. The legal principles are founded on the sources of
international law laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ. Through a review of
different sources of international law, the conclusion is that odious debts arise without the
consent of the population, without benefit to them, and with the knowledge of the
creditor. The paper also concludes that there are at least three legal grounds for
repudiating odious debt.
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I.

Introduction

Generally, to be obliged by a loan contract the state must express its free consent.1 This
consent has a legal consequence: an obligation of the state to repay the debt it has
contracted.2 Any debt arises as a result of a contract that must be performed in good faith
in order to be valid. Good faith means that parties must respect their contracts according
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.3 However, this principle is not absolute. The
existence of any defect to the will of the parties leads to the nullification of the contract.
In addition, even if states are obliged to respect their contracts, there are strong arguments
from state practice and judicial precedent to support a legal privilege to repudiate debts
that originated odiously.
Historically, the odious debt doctrine dates back to the Mexican revolution. During
the period between 1863 and 1867 Emperor Maximilian contracted debts with France at
high interest rates in order to stabilize his rule and suppress any opposition. Pomeroy
mentions that “[a] large part of those debts has been created to maintain that usurper in
his place against the legitimate authority and all of them were most scandalously
usurious.”4After the Mexican revolution, Benito Juarez, who won the presidential
election, issued a decision, refusing to pay a sizable portion of the Mexican debt.5 He
based his decision on the grounds that the state was in a revolution and all these debts
were odious debt committed by the former corrupt regime. He succeeded in suspending
payment of the external debt for two years until the French intervention in Mexico led by
Emperor Napoleon.6

1

CÉCILE LAMARQUE & RENAUD VIVIEN, SUSPENDING PUBLIC DEBT REPAYMENTS BY LEGAL MEANS 1,
http://cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/Comment_suspendre_paiements_sur_base_legale_EN.pdf.
2
Id.
3
ANTHONY D’AMATO, GOOD FAITH, IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC LAW 599, 600 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1992).
4
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIME OF PEACE 1, 75 (Theodore
Salisbury Woolsey ed., Bos. & New York: Hloughton, Mifflin, 1886).
5
The Economic History of Mexico, available at http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/mexhist01.htm (last
visited May 9, 2013).
6
Samuel Harrison Rankin, Union And Confederate Diplomacy In Response To French Intervention In
Mexico, 1861-1367, 79 (University of Wyoming, August, 1966).

Other countries besides Mexico also invoked the odious debt. Twenty one years later
following the Spanish-American war, Spain ceded to the United States Cuba, the
Philippines and other territories. A debt problem emerged between the United States and
Spain as to whether Cuba was responsible for the Spanish debt based on a contract signed
during the Spanish rule of Cuba. This proposal was rejected, and the United States
confirmed that Cuba was not committed to pay those debts under any condition. The
United States refused to pay the Cuban debt that was concluded by Spain to finance its
operation in Cuba and to be secured by Cuban revenue.7 The amendment, which was
incorporated in the U.S. Constitution on July 9th 1868 reflects the American
commissioners’8 desire to get rid of that debt. Section 4 of the 14 amendment states:
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void9
The rejection was based on the odious nature of the debt and based on three points:the
contract had not been signed for the benefit of Cuba, Cuba did not consent to such debt,
and Spain knew when it signed the contract that the debt would not benefit the Cubans.10
On December 10th 1898, in the Peace Treaty of Paris, Spain relinquished her sovereignty
over Cuba to the United States. With that treaty the United States did not recognize the
1886 and 1890 Cuban debts that were ultimately rejected for odious reasons.11
7

In 1890, U.S. investments in Cuba amounted to $50 million and 7% of U.S. foreign trade was with the
island. Spain spent $7 million on Cuban imported goods whereas U.S. imports from the archipelago
amounted to $61 million. U.S. economic interests entailed the need for the U.S. to closely control the
Cuban market in order to protect U.S. investments. This was exactly at that time that the United States
decided to intervene, when Spain was put to rout. The U.S. wanted to despoil the Cuban people of its
independence, an independence that had been conquered with machetes. U.S. Democrat Senator from
Virginia John W. Daniel accused the U.S. government of intervening to prevent a Spanish defeat: "When
the most favorable time for a revolutionary victory and the most unfavorable time for Spain came the
United States Congress is asked to put the U.S. army into the hands of the President to forcibly impose an
armistice between the two parties, one of them having already surrendered."
The armistice was signed on December, 10, 1898 in Paris, by the United States and Spain. The Cubans
were excluded from the talks.
8
American commissioners with Spain to drop all Cuban debt after the war.
9
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
10
Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a Functional
Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 109, 113 (2008).
11
Stéphanie Collet, How big is the Financial Penalty for Dictators? The Case of Cuban Bonds at the time
of Independence 15 (Université Libre de Bruxelles, July 2010).
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In 1900, the term war debt began to be formulated, particularly after the Second Boer
War.12 Britain refused to accept responsibility for those loan notes issued by the Boer
Republics in order to finance their respective war. The Crown council denied compelling
the British government any obligations during the war or in the contemplation of the
war.13 The Peace treaties after the First World War provided for dropping debt that was
not for the benefit of the state. For example, the Versailles treaty concluded between
Germany and the Allies exempted Poland from paying the debt owed to Germany
attributable to the measures taken by the Government for the German colonization of
Poland.14
In 1923, Tinoco arbitration case Great Britain v. Costa Rica was an example of
rejecting odious debt after government succession.15 “Costa Rica refused to honor loans
made by the Royal Bank of Canada to the former dictator Federico Tinoco. This is an
example of state practice with respect to a change of [G] overnment and not state
succession. It is also an example of an instance where the issue of odiousness of the debt

12

The Second Boer War was fought from 11 October 1899 until 31 May 1902 between the British
Empire and the Afrikaans-speaking settlers of two independent Boer republics, the South African
Republic and the Orange Free State.
13
David C. Gray, DEVILRY, COMPLICITY, And GREED: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE And ODIOUS
DEBT, 70 L. & Contemp. Probs. 137, 139 (2007).
14
NORMAN A. GRAEBNER & EDWARD M. BENNETT, THE VERSAILLES TREATY AND ITS LEGACY 141-166
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
15
Government of Costa Rica was ousted and the new government passed a law refuting all Ks and made
another Constitution. When this administration fell Great Britain sued Costa Rica for obligations. Costa
Rica's new government asserts no authority regarding what the old government did. Incredible Britain says
that Tinoco (the leader of the old government) was the administration unquestionably and de jur – Cost
Rica says Tinoco wasn't a legislature in worldwide law. Tinoco gotten a mess of remote obligation while
running Costa Rica, incorporating with Great Britain. Indeed, an illicit government might tie a state to
worldwide commitments. Global law looks to the State, not the government substance w/in the state. When
government in force as opposed to worldwide law, not just local law, then regulation of state congruity
won't usually apply. Tinoco was a sovereign government. In spite of the fact that a few satiates did not
distinguish it – that can't exceed the confirmation unveiled that genuine it was an administration. The
inquiry is not if the administration maintains a constitution however is: Has it made itself in such a path, to
the point that all w/in the its impact distinguish its control, and that there is no contradicting compel
expecting to be a government in its place. As long as it is the viable legislature of the state – it is the
administration of the state. Obligations owed are not owed by the administration of the day yet between the
state – the main lawful substance that is important is the state. Extraordinary Britain was ready to maintain
a case against Costa Rica since the Ks were made with, available at REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL AWARDS RECUEIL DES SENTENCES ARBITRALEShttp://www.un.org/law/riaa/ (last
visited Novamber 5, 2013).
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became salient in a claim espoused on behalf of a private creditor.”16 The chief justice
Taft of the U.S. Supreme Court, sitting as an arbitrator, held that the political transition
had affected the government existence but not to affect the obligations unless there is bad
faith from the contracting parties:
The transactions in question, which in themselves did not constitute transactions
of an ordinary nature and which were “full of irregularities,” were made at a time
when the popularity of the Tinoco Government had disappeared, and when the
political and military movement aiming at the overthrow of that Government was
gaining strength. The payments made by the bank were either in favour of
Frederico Tinoco himself for “expenses of representation of the Chief of the State
in his approaching trip abroad,” or to his brother as salary and expenses in respect
of a diplomatic post to which the latter was appointed by Tinoco. “The case of the
Royal Bank depends not on the mere form of the transaction but upon the good
faith of the bank in the payment of money for the real use of the Costa Rican
Government under the Tinoco régime. It must make out its case of actual
furnishing of money to the government for its legitimate use. It has not done so.
The bank knew that this money was to be used by the retiring president, F.
Tinoco, for his personal support after he had taken refuge in a foreign country. It
could not hold his own government for the money paid to him for this purpose.”
The position was essentially the same in respect to the payments made to
Tinoco’s brother. The Royal Bank of Canada cannot be deemed to have proved
that the payments were made for legitimate governmental use. Its claim must
fail17
The refusal to pay the money was not only based on its beings transaction after an
authoritarian regime, but on the existence of bad faith on the part of the bank when
paying the money. Tinoco used the money for its interest and the bank knew at the time
of lending the money that it would be used for personal benefit.
In 1927, Alexander Sack developed the first conceived theory for dropping all odious
debt committed. A debt contracted by a regular government can nevertheless be odious if
the new government can prove “a) that the purposes in the light of which the old
government had contracted the debt in question were odious and openly contrary to the
interests of the people. b) That the creditor at the moment when the loan was issued, were

16

Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 18 October 1923, (1924) 2 ILR 34–39; (1924) 18 AJIL 147–74; (1922)
116 BFSP 438-43; 1UNRILA369.
17
Id.
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aware of its odious destination.”18 He states that creditors aware of the consequences
“have committed a hostile act with regard to the people; they can’t therefore expect that a
nation freed from a despotic power assume the "odious" debts, which are personal debts
of that power.”19
In addition to the previous examples, the German repudiation of Austrian debts in
1938 reflects the criteria for determining its odiousness. To prevent a union between
Austria and Germany, the United States claimed that Austria was loaded with a lot of
debt and if the Union was committed, Germany would be responsible for that debt. The
debate after that between Germany and the United States was about the reasons for that
debt, and whether it was for the benefit of the Austrian citizens or not. Germany claimed
that this debt was contracted against the benefit of Austrian citizens while the United
States claimed that this debt was contracted for the purpose of food purchasing.20
In 1947, after the Second World War, the peace treaty between France and Italy
provided that it was inconceivable that Ethiopia should bear the burden of debts
contracted by Italy to guarantee its command on Ethiopian territory.21 It should be kept in
mind that the World Bank is directly involved in some colonial debts during the period
1950s and 1960s it loaned colonial countries to maximize the profits they derived from
colonial exploitation. The debts granted by the World Bank to the colonial authorities
within their colonial policies were later transferred to the newly independent states
without their consent.22
Subsequent to these arguments, the doctrine was raised on occasion by international
lawyers. In 1977, there was an international attempt to codify the theory of odious debt.
The International Law Commission (ILC) worked on its draft articles on Succession of
States in respect of matters other than treaties. There was an article at the end of the draft

18

Max Mader & André Rothenbühler, How to Challenge Illegitimate Debt: Theory and Legal Case Studies
68, (Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz 2009).
19
Ochoa, supra note 10, at 116.
20
Robert Howse, The Concept Of Odious Debt In Public International Law 12, (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development Discussion Paper No.185, July 2007).
21
Treaty of Peace with Italy, Signed at Paris, (10 February 1947), available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2049/v49.pdf.
22
Kema Irogbe, Bretton Woods Twins and the Odious Debts of Poor Countries, 1-12 (Claflin University,
2005).
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not to transfer odious debts to the new state. Article 18 section D provided that “[Except
in the case of the uniting of States,] odious debts contracted by the predecessor State are
not transferable to the successor State.”23 This section provides for succession of state
and change of state personality. During that period of time political transactions is not
acceptable as a reason for dropping debt. For instance, seven years later, in Jackson v.
People’s Republic of China24 the district court held for the validity of the odious debt
only when there was a change in the state personality. It held that “It is an established
principle of international law that changes in the government or the internal policy of a
state does not as a rule affects its position in international law.”25The court established
that international obligation is ranked higher than a change of government or a regime. A
state remains responsible for its obligation and treaties that it has signed, even if there is a
change in its political system.
In contrast to the previous court decision, in 1982 the United States claimed that Iran
owed a large sum of money as a result of a contract concluded by Iran in 1948 to buy
some surplus military property from World War II. The Islamic Republic of Iran refused
to carry that debt on the grounds that it was odious debt and could not be transferred to
the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this case the Iran claims tribunal rejected the claim of the
Islamic Republic of Iran on the ground that state personality does not change after a
revolution. The tribunal provided that
In any event, the Tribunal will limit itself to stating that the said [odious debt]
concept belongs to the realm of law of state succession. That law does not find
application to the events in Iran. The revolutionary changes in Iran fall under the
heading of state continuity, not state succession. This statement does not exclude
a realist approach that recognizes that in practice the border between the concepts
of continuity and succession is not always rigid. In spite of the change in head of
23

Mohammed Bedjaoui, Ninth Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other Than Treaties,
reprinted in (1981)2 V.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, para 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/301l1981/Add.l of 13.
24
This case is an agreeable universal law case spinning around the potential sway of the People's Republic
of China. It was discovered that the PRC does have sway far from the US Courts and was conceded
Absolute Invulnerability. This is a continuation of six different claims that happened preceding 1952. These
incorporate suits against the USSR, Mexico, Poland and two against the PRC for bonds issued soon after
1920. One new imperative attention of the case is China's conflict that an elucidation giving the FSIA
retroactive impact soon after 1952 might damage due process. This case is generally dependable right up 'til
the present time, yet diverse understanding of pivotal words from the FSIA can yield distinctive running the
show, Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986).
25
James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old And New: The Legal Intellectual History Of An Idea, 70 L. &
Contemp. Probs.193193, 194 (2007).
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State and the system of government in 1979, Iran remained the same subject of
international law as before the Islamic Revolution. For when a Government is
removed through a revolution, the State, as an international person, remains
unchanged and the new Government generally assumes all the previous
international rights and obligations of the State26
In addition to the previous example, in 2003, after the fall of the Saddam Hussein
regime, the idea of odious debt turned back to the corruption of the previous regime. The
concept of odious debt developed to include not only state debt, but also regime debt.27
Patricia Adams claimed that all Iraq debt, about $125 billion, was used to finance
dictatorship and military aggression.28 In addition, Paul Wolfowitz, former President of
the World Bank, stated that most of Iraq’s debt “had been used to buy weapons and to
build palaces and to build instruments of oppression.”29 He agrees that the new regime is
not responsible for the debt arising from the previous regime. To get around this, the Iraqi
government decided not to rely on the theory of odious debts and instead pursue needbased debt relief from the Paris Club and has succeeded in doing so.30
For the development of the odious debt concept, state benefit is the main reason to
reject odious debt. In 2006, Norway cancelled about $80 million of debt owed by five
developing countries. Although the countries benefit from the debt but the development
recognized does not achieved.31 In December 2008, Rafael Correa, President of the
Republic of Ecuador, declared Ecuador's national debt odious, grounded on the argument
that it was contracted by despotic and corrupt prior regimes. He succeeded in reducing
the amount of the debt before continuing to pay the balance.32
The concept of odious debt refers to a set of considerations of equity used to justify
the abolition or modification of debt obligations in the context of political changes on the
grounds that the former regime is odious and citizens have not benefited from these debts
26

The United States of America v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (Case No. B36), Award No. 574-B36-2, 3
December 1996), 32 Iran-United States C.T.R. 162 (1996):175–176.
27

Howse, supra note 20, at 2.
Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts 12 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 526, 2004).
29
Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious
Debts, 48 Va. J. of Int'l L.595, 601 (2008).
30
Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 L. & Contemp. Probs. 139, 144 (2007).
31
Mader, supra note 18, at 18.
32
Arturo C. Porzecanski, When Bad Things Happen To Good Sovereign Debt Contracts: The Case Of
Ecuador, 1 DUKE U. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2010).
28
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or to suppress them with the knowledge of the creditor.33 During the last century,
especially during the post-colonial era to the present time, many changes occurred for
political systems, whether through revolutions, such as the Mexican Revolution, or wars
such as the Spanish-American war, or secession, or the peaceful evolution of societies.
All these transitions gave rise to a question on the ability of the successor regimes to
repudiate the obligations of previous regimes. The claim is that debt must not be fulfilled,
since it is a personal debt borne by the regime only to serve its interest. There are
different criteria to consider these debts as odious. Some scholars argue that the criteria
should be about the debt itself, not the parties. There must be a determination of the
validity of the debt, whether the parties are odious or not.34 Other scholars set a condition
that a creditor state must know at the time of lending that this money will not be used in
the interest of the people of the state, rather for personal interest.35
The following two chapters will explore the doctrine of odious debts in international
law. The first chapter will discuss different definitions of odious debt and their criteria.
The second chapter will focus on the normative basis for canceling odious debt in
international law. Accordingly, the article will focus on the sources of international law
laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ as grounds for determining the legal basis for
canceling odious debt. The focus here is on international treaty and international
customary law. The paper argues that there are sufficient grounds from state practice,
precedent, and treaty law to base the doctrine of odious debts on customary international
law as opposed to on ad hoc considerations of equity.

33

Jonathan Shafter, The Due Diligence Model: An Executive Approach to Odious
Debt Reform, 32N. Carolina J. of Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 669, 671 n. (2007); Howse, supra note 20, at 5.
34
Paul B. Stephan, The Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 214, 220 (2007).
35
Id.
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II.

The Concept of Odious Debt
A. Types of State Debt

The state debt means the entire sum of the outstanding debt obligations of a country's
central government, in which the debtor is required to refund the amount and its interest
on the deadlines that are agreed on.36 In the context of state succession, the Vienna
Convention on the Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
(not yet in force) defined state debt as “any financial obligation of a predecessor state
arising in conformity with international law towards another state, an international
organization or any other subject of international law.”37
In addition to the definition of state debt set by the Vienna Convention, Gaston Jeze
uses the term public debt to refer to state debt. He states that “public debt is the individual
legal situation of the State's administrative patrimony: it is the legal obligation of the
administrative patrimony to pay a certain sum of money to a given creditor.”38 Alexandre
Sack defined the legal consequence of state debt as contractual obligations of the state
guaranteed by it:
[D]ebts of the state, of a political community organized as a State … these debts
are contractual obligations of the State. By lending to the State or purchasing
State bonds, public creditors become the possessors of acquired rights, namely,
debt-claims against the debtor state … state debts are guaranteed by the entire
patrimony of the State.39
The International Law Association offers another definition of state debt: “the
national debt, that is, the debt shown in the general revenue accounts of the central
government and unrelated to any particular territory or any assets.”40 This definition
describes only the cases in which the debt is concluded by the central government and not
related to any particular territory, however, there are cases in which the debt is concluded
by the central government and used for a particular territory. This is called localized debt.
36

Ugo Panizza, Domestic And External Public Debt In Developing Countries 14, (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development Discussion Paper No. 188, March 1, 2008).
37
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, art. 33, 22
ILM 306 (1983) / UN Doc A/CONF.117/14 (1983).
38
Bedjaoui, supra note 23, at 57.
39
Id. at 57.
40
International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Fourth Conference held at the Hague, 23rd-29th
August, 1970 108 (1971).
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The debtor is the State and the user is a given province.41 The Special Rapporteur to the
International Law Commission, Mohammed Bedjaoui, proposes that state debt can be
defined as “(a) [a] debt contracted by the central government of the state and therefore
legally binding on the state itself, and (b) [a] debt chargeable to the central treasury of the
state.” He suggests a simple point about state debt that defines state debt as “a financial
obligation contracted by the central government of a state and chargeable to the treasury
of that State.”42 Within state debt, debt obligations are generally divided into three
categories: public state debt, localized debt, and debt of public enterprises. These
distinctions are particularly relevant in moments of political transitions in the context of
state succession, change of governments.
1. Public State Debt
Article 33 of the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property defines state debt as “any financial obligation of a predecessor State arising in
conformity with international law towards another State, an international organisation or
any other subject of international law.”43 States are the contracting parties; the debtor is a
state, and the creditor is another state or an international organization. Financial
responsibilities are based on a contract or a treaty governed by international law.
Although there are representatives of the state singing this debt, the state assumes all the
obligations and benefits arising from such debt.44 Hence, the debt must be for the benefit
of the state not the benefit of its representatives.
2. Localized Debt

The second kinds of state debts are localized debts. These debts are contracted by the
state to use in specific locations of its territory. It is not contracted by the local authority
as the local debt, rather by the state itself. Localized debt differs from local debt that is
contracted by a local body usually not the central government authority. This debt may be
contracted by “a territorial authority inferior to the State used by that authority in its own
name. Such territory has a degree of financial autonomy; with the result that these debts
41

Bedjaoui, supra note 23, at 58.
Bedjaoui, supra note 23, at 69.
43
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts , supra note
37, at art.35.
44
Panizza, supra note 36, at 14.
42
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are identifiable.”45 Thus, these debts are not by the name of the state and cannot oblige
the state as a whole. Simply the difference between localized and local debt is that:
A local debt incurred by a municipality or an organized section of the
community with local autonomy would, if backed by a guarantee from the
central Government, be only one step removed from a State debt .... [A]
localized debt, which meant one incurred by the central Government for a
particular part of the country, was very similar to a debt of a local community
or entity guaranteed by the State .... Consequently, the difference between
a local debt and a localized debt, when such debts were guaranteed by the
central Government, tended to be blurred.46
In short, the mere distinction between local and localized debt can be based on the
authority that conclude the debt and the purpose for its use.
3. Debts of Public Enterprises

The third kind of state debt is the debt of public enterprises. Public enterprises can be
defined as “institutions which have their own legal personality and autonomy of
administration and management, and are intended to provide a particular service or to
perform specific functions.”47 Bejudoi states that, although the debt of public enterprises
has a public character it is not considered as being a state debt. In the case of state
succession, a state is not responsible for such debts.48 Contrary to the previous opinion
another scholar proposes that the debt of public enterprises is the debt of the state:
“Under certain constitutional arrangements, public enterprises were sometimes
completely autonomous, but more often a public enterprise was simply an arm of the
central government that had limited financial autonomy and was usually indirectly
accountable to the central Government, which kept watch over its activities.”49 According
to this view, the debt of the public enterprise is guaranteed by the state, and the successor
state is responsible for it.50
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B. Definition of Odious Debt
Since the doctrine has been dealt by a number of scholars, it is useful to survey earlier
treatments and restate the doctrine in an analytical precision. Accordingly, this section
traces the legal history of the doctrine, review the definitions provided by legal scholars.
Finally, it combines acceptable types of odious debts, and identifies contemporary
definition of odious debts.
1. Defintion of Odious Debt in International Legal Scholarship
International law scholars do not share a definition of odious debts. Their definitions are
sometimes over-inclusive and broad, and in others under inclusive and narrow. Broad
definitions have negative impact on international financial stability, narrow definitions
might make economic recovery after political transitions more difficult to achieve.
Hence, it is essential to review the evolution of the concept of odious debt to assess its
ideal legal formulation.
Sack provided the first modern formulation of odious debts; he used the expression to
refer to regime debt. He stated that
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State,
but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against
it, etc., this debt is odious for the population of all the State. This debt is not an
obligation for the nation; it is a regime’s debt, a personal debt of the power that
has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of this power.51
Thus, any debt concluded to enhance the power of the autocratic authority of the ruling
group and is not in the interest of the people is odious debt. This debt only obliges the
contractor personally and not the state. He states the reasons for which he considers these
debts to be odious. They are the debt must be against the consent and interests of the
borrower and the lender know at the time of lending.
The reason these ‘odious’ debts cannot be considered to encumber the territory of
the State, is that such debts do not fulfill one of the conditions that determine the
legality of the debts of the State, that is: the debts of the State must be incurred
and the funds from it employed for the needs and in the interest of the State.
‘odious’ debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the knowledge of the
creditors, are contrary to the interests of the nation, do not compromise the latter –
51
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in the case that the nation succeeds in getting rid of the government which incurs
them – except to the extent that real advantages were obtained from these debts.
The creditors have committed a hostile act with regard to the people; they can’t
therefore expect that a nation freed from a despotic power assume the ‘odious’
debts, which are personal debts of that power. Even when a despotic power is
replaced by another, no less despotic or any more responsible to the will of the
people, the ‘odious’ debts of the eliminated power are not any less their personal
debts and are not obligations for the new power…One could also include in this
category of debts the loans incurred by members of the government to serve
interests manifestly personal interest that are unrelated to the interest of the
State.52
Sack identified three conditions that must be achieved collectively in order to
consider a debt odious. For him, the debt is odious when there is a combination of an
odious regime and the non-benefit use of the debt.53 More specifically, Sack claimed that
a regime is entitled to repudiate any debt obligations entered into by its predecessor
provided the following three conditions are satisfied: the debt was contracted without the
consent of the population; it was acquired for a purpose that would not benefit that
population; and the creditor was aware of the foregoing points (i.e. the lack of popular
consent and benefit) when advancing the loan monies. The people of the state in question
obtained no benefit from the debt – that is, the loan proceeds need not actually have been
employed contrary to the interests of the population; it is sufficient that they were used in
a way which did not advance them. Of course, even debts which merely fail to confer any
benefit may be worthy of the appellation odious by virtue of the fact that the people of a
state will suffer harm if they are forced to repay debts which did not actually serve their
interests.
According to these three criteria, any debt beneficial to the state is not considered
odious even if it is concluded by a brutal authority. It is mandatory to have the three
criteria present to consider a debt odious. These terms are arranged logically; hence, any
debt resulting from an odious act of a regime is not considered odious in advance unless
it does not benefit the state. The non-existence of a public beneficiary is not sufficient to
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consider a debt odious without being concluded by an odious regime. Buchheit, Gulati &
Thompson respond to Sack’s three argument that
the idea of loans that were used only to “strengthen” the governing regime,
“suppress a popular insurrection” or were otherwise “hostile” to the interest of the
people of the country. From Taft’s decision in the Tinoco Arbitration, Sack
gleaned the requirement that the lender know about the illegitimate purpose of the
borrowing before the loan could be branded objectionable, as well as the notion
that such a debt was “personal” to the ruler who commissioned it54
Sack’s perspective was that state should not bear the debt of tyrannical regimes. An
authoritarian regime, which does not represent the nation, lacks the legitimacy to act on
its behalf. However, not all debt concluded by those regimes are repugnant, as the debt
must not be of benefit to the state.
Sack tried to protect the innocent creditor. It is not logical to oblige creditor acting in
good faith to forgive the debt unless he knows the misuse of those debts. Accordingly,
only a creditor who knew at the time of concluding the contract that the ruling party was
despotic and the debt would not benefit the state may be called to commit a hostile act
and is responsible for canceling the debt.55 The burden of proof would switch to the
relevant lenders to adduce evidence that their loans had in fact benefited the population of
the state in some way and therefore merited repayment.56 If the creditors were unable to
do so, then the new sovereign would be justified in not repaying them.57
Unlike Sack who used the term subjugated debt inter changeably with odious debt,
Bustamante differentiates between subjugated debt and war debt. He defines subjugation
debts as any “public debts created by the former state before the war of independence and
charged to [the] general treasury of the region that subsequently became independent,
with the direct or indirect intention of maintaining or ensuring its domination and
preventing the birth of a new State.”58 Whereas war debt is debt used to finance the
preparation or prosecution of the war:
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debts contracted during a war of independence by the previous sovereign to cover
the costs of that war … It would be said in private law that the costs of a lawsuit
cannot be imposed on the winning party, and in public law it cannot be claimed
that one of the parties should assume the obligations engendered or created to
prevent, directly or indirectly, its birth and its existence.59
In contrast, some scholars try to narrow the concept of odious debt. Vikram Nehru
and Mark Thomas support the idea that even if the parties on the issue lender and creditor
do not agree on the definition of odious debt, they should be confident that these debts
are not used for the benefit of the borrowing state.60 The concept of odious debt is too
broad, and the lending state may not accept these cases as odious debts. They think that
the concept of odious debt may include criminal, unfair, and ineffective debts. They
propose support for the doctrine of odious with national bodies from civil society
organizations and cooperation from lenders to prevent corruption in the state and to
follow the debt to ensure its effectiveness to the society.61 Each debt not subject to this
procedure would be considered an odious debt.
Feilchenfeld, on the other hand, uses the term imposed debts to refer to odious debt.
He uses this term instead of the term subjugation debt. Imposed debts do not mean debts
contracted without the consent of the rulers or the representatives of the state. Rather,
they mean debts created without the consent of debtor state citizens who are totally
responsible for paying those debts.62 Thus, there must be a legitimate purpose for public
borrowing; he contends that
For practical purposes, an investigation of the just grounds for the creation of
debts may be restricted to those which for centuries have been regarded as
sufficient or necessary in most systems of positive law of most of the civilized
nations. A survey of these systems shows that the creation of debts is justified
either by the necessity of raising money for public purposes, by the doctrine that
compensation is owed for tortious acts to injured persons, by consent of the
debtor, or by benefits received by the debtor63
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Although he does not distinguish the absence of benefit and the absence of consent, he
concludes that borrowing for private enrichment is sufficient for absence of benefit.
As we see here, definitions of odious debt vary but based on these definitions any
debt obtained against the will and benefit of citizens with the knowledge of the creditor
can be considered as odious debt. This includes the typology of four types of odious debt:
war debt, subjugation debt, illegal occupation debt, and fraudulent, illegal, or corruptionrelated debt.
2. Contemporary Usage: The Three Criteria
After reviewing several scholars’ definitions of odious debt, as well as reviewing
numerous cases in which various countries tried to repudiate debts on the basis of their
odious character, it is essential to review the exact criteria for determining a debt to be
odious. Several recent treatments of odious debt focusing on the three elements inherent
in the American Commissioner’s repayment of the Cuban loans, and in Sack’s statement
of the doctrine are relevant for a debt to be odious; it must be against the will and benefit
of the state with the knowledge of the creditor. There must be a connection between the
debt and the regime. The following explores these three conditions.
a. Odious regime
There are two ways to prove that a regime is odious either through international
recognition or through citizens’ non-consent. The mere use systematic oppression64 or
organized looting by any regime or state makes it odious.65 The odiousness of a regime
64
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might be difficult to prove in practice. Some “objective” indicators can be useful in this
respect. The recognition of international organizations carries a great deal of weight to
prove the odiousness of that regime. The mere recognition of international institutions
such as the United Nations about the existence of systematic repression in a state makes
the ruling regime odious, even if individuals do not express their dissatisfaction; citizens
may be unable to express oppression.66 The regime may appear to be a fair regime and
not repress its own citizens, but the regime commits organized looting. In that situation,
there may be no popular anger against the regime, but the mere recognition from an
international organization or community such as the International Monetary Fund is
sufficient. This international organization can acknowledge the organized looting
committed by the regime making it adequate enough to consider the regime odious.67
In addition to international recognition of regime odious acts, absence of the
borrower state citizens’ consent is a reflection of odious regime. This indicator has
origins in Sack’s concern with authoritarian regimes and was a main component of the
Cuban debt affair. Finding a debt odious must include a finding of lack of citizens’
consent, and it is not limited to dictator regimes. Bedjaoui also include an implied
condition for the existence of lack of citizens’ consent in subjugation debts.
Protesting to the policies of the existing regime is not enough to consider the regime
odious. Citizens must perform appropriate legal action exhibiting the necessity of
removing the odious regime and debts incurred by it.68 It is essential to prove the
existence of an act to reject the regime by citizens in a legal manner accepted by
international law.
A third indicator of odiousness of the regime relates to whether or not the debt is
consistent with international law. Mohammed Bedjaoui contends that a debt must not be
against the principle of contemporary international law: “From the standpoint of the
international community, an odious debt could be taken to mean any debt contracted for
purposes that are not in conformity with contemporary international law and, in
66

Id. “Odious regimes sometimes suppress a subgroup of the population, as with blacks in Apartheid South
Africa and Jews in Nazi Germany, and they sometimes suppress the entire population, as with Idi Amin's
Uganda.”
67
Id.
68
Id..

17

particular, the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations.”69 For example, any debt which violates the basic rules of human rights is an
odious debt. Further, any debt which leads to the violation of the sovereignty of nations is
odious debt. Generally, any loan or debt between a state and another state, or the
International World Bank used contrary to jus cogens is an odious debt. One example are
loans granted by the World Bank to the Government of Uzbekistan, which has a terrible
record on human rights and the United Nations has confirmed that what is happening
there is systematic torture.70 However, the World Bank report did not specifically refer to
human rights violations there and just talked about the unfriendly business environment
and that the obstacles to growth are about macroeconomic stability, removing barriers to
trade, and privatization.71 Indeed, the debt that violates jus cogens is a debt not for the
benefit of the citizens. In Ecuador, the commission of integral audit of public debt
(CAIC) stated that conditions attached to the loan programs enforced by the World Bank
and other multilateral institutions means denying state sovereignty and interfering in its
internal affairs. Many multilateral loans also violate economic, social and cultural rights.
The CAIC recommended stopping paying server debt claimed by multilateral
institutions.72
International conventions provides for the nullification of treaties violating jus co
gens. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties nullifies any agreement that against
jus cogens. Article 53 of the treaty provides that:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character
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The existence of such a clause explicitly or implicitly in the contract nullifies the contract
for violating the rules of jus cogens; it can be avoided by removing such violation. This
simple example is not ambiguous because it is a hateful debt raised for an odious
purpose. The problem arises when the regime contracts to purchase weapons without
determining the purposes for which they will be used. For example a regime may take a
loan from an international bank without defining the purpose and after that use this loan
in operations against its own people, or at least against their benefit, and for the benefit of
the system itself.
b. The absence of the benefit
A common problem of the doctrine is of the difficulty of defining absence of benefit. It is
essential to determine how and when the debt is not beneficial. The debt must be nonbeneficial both in purpose and in effect.73 The amount of debt which is forgiven is
determined according to the extent the state actually benefited. The absence of benefit is
a central aspect to all proposed definitions. In the various definitions proposed so far,
scholars such as Sack, Feilchenfeld, and Bedjaoui discuss three main elements: “the
intensity or the hostility of the harm/lack of benefit; whether the loan must be nonbeneficial [i]n purpose and in effect, or if either of the two is sufficient in of itself;
whether and when general purpose loans might be deemed non-beneficial.”74 A country
may seek the extent of its commitment to implement contracts signed by the previous
regime and the extent of mandatory debt arising from those contracts.
Mohammed Bedjaoui contends that a debt must not be against the principle of
contemporary international law: “From the standpoint of the international community, an
odious debt could be taken to mean any debt contracted for purposes that are not in
conformity with contemporary international law and, in particular, the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”75 For example, any
debt which violates the basic rules of human rights is an odious debt. Further, any debt
73

Jeff King, & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 43-46 (CISDL Working Paper No.
COM/RES/ESJ, 2003).
74
Miyazaki Takashi, Recognition Of States And Governments In International Law: Theory And Practice
Y.B. Int'l L. & Aff (2010).
75
Bedjaoui, supra note 23, at 69.

19

which leads to the violation of the sovereignty of nations is odious debt. Generally, any
loan or debt between a state and another state, or the International World Bank used
contrary to jus cogens is an odious debt. One example are loans granted by the World
Bank to the Government of Uzbekistan, which has a terrible record on human rights and
the United Nations has confirmed that what is happening there is systematic torture.76
However, the World Bank report did not specifically refer to human rights violations
there and just talked about the unfriendly business environment and that the obstacles to
growth are about macroeconomic stability, removing barriers to trade, and privatization.77
Indeed, the debt that violates jus cogens is a debt not for the benefit of the citizens. In
Ecuador, the commission of integral audit of public debt (CAIC) stated that conditions
attached to the loan programs enforced by the World Bank and other multilateral
institutions means denying state sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs. Many
multilateral loans also violate economic, social and cultural rights. The CAIC
recommended stopping paying server debt claimed by multilateral institutions.78 Indeed, I
believe that not all international institutions debt must be cancelled, but only those debts
that violate jus cogens norms of international law.
International conventions provides for the nullification of treaties violating jus co
gens. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties nullifies any agreement that against
jus cogens. Article 53 of the treaty provides that:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character
The existence of such a clause explicitly or implicitly in the contract nullifies the contract
for violating the rules of jus cogens; it can be avoided by removing such violation. This
76
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simple example is not ambiguous because it is a hateful debt raised for an odious
purpose. The problem arises when the regime contracts to purchase weapons without
determining the purposes for which they will be used. For example a regime may take a
loan from an international bank without defining the purpose and after that use this loan
in operations against its own people, or at least against their benefit, and for the benefit of
the system itself.
The problem here is finding a relationship between the debt emerging from the
contract and the work carried out by the state without the benefit of individuals. The
existence and proof of this relationship is very significant. In fact, when determining
whether citizens benefit from such a debt or not, it is not only essential to look at the
provisions of the contract or the intent of the contract; there must also be consideration of
the consequences resulting from the contract. The matter here is the result of such a debt.
International law does not allow any violation of the jus cogens rules or cause any
damage to the interests of individuals, or even not-benefiting them, regardless of the form
of this debt. Therefore, the debt causing a violation of international norms or non-benefit
to citizens is odious debt, whether the violation is agreed upon or not in the contract.79
It is essential to determine whether and when general purpose loans might be deemed
non-beneficial; a state faces three scenarios;
The first is the case in which a creditor signs a contract with a predecessor regime,
carries out its full obligations, and the debt is deserved. The successor regime claims that
these debts are odious because it was not for the interest of the people. In addition, the
current regime alleges that the predecessor regime was an odious one, and the lender
knew that. Moreover, the lender knew that this debt would not be used for the benefit of
the people or at least not essential to citizens. This is the common situation of the
problem of odious debts, whereby the debtor state tries to get rid of all the debts.80
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The Second is the case in which a creditor signs a contract with a predecessor regime,
and part of the obligation is implemented. The debt is not entirely due and may be
undeserved until the creditor complies with its full obligation.81 This situation raises two
initial problems; on the one hand, there is a problem on the part of the creditor. Is it
possible for the debtor state to claim that the debt is odious and did not benefit the
citizens, although the commitment is not complete? On the other hand, there is a problem
with the part not implemented by the creditor. Is it permissible for the debtor state to get
rid of this debt under the pretext that this debt would not benefit the people and it had
been signed by an odious regime?
In both of the above cases, the opinion is to declare the invalidity of the entire
contract. The sole purpose of avoidance of the contract is the deterrence of the creditor to
be sure about the purpose for which the debtor took the money. This requires a detailed
explanation of the reasons for the loan from the borrower and the purpose, in which the
money will be used to allow the creditor to be aware of the total context to avoid the
invalidity of the contract. The problem with this opinion is that it leaves the loan contract
itself alone and seeks the knowledge of the lender about the purpose of lending.
Therefore, the element here is not only to prove the knowledge of the lender about the
purpose of the borrowing, but also to prove the relationship between the money and its
use. This relation is essential before allowing the current regime to ask for the voiding of
the contract, in cases where the money was already used by the predecessor regime. This
brings us to the timing at which moment should the utility be evaluated? At the time of
lending, or when making a decision on whether or not the debt is odious, and did not
benefit citizens? It only makes sense from the legal perspective to look at the timing of
the lending – otherwise its obligation the monitoring function to lenders, which
obviously, they are either unable to do or would make the loan too expensive.82
The third scenario a country may face is the case in which a creditor signs a contract
with a predecessor regime and does not implement any part of the obligation. The current
regime may claim that it is not responsible for the debt arising from this contract since the
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contract and the debt emerging from it does not benefit the citizens and was signed by an
odious regime for its interest only. The debt does not violate the international jus cogens,
and cannot, until now, be considered odious, but the money is likely to be used for odious
purposes and against the benefit of citizens. If so, there is no need to prove that the lender
knew the reasons for that debt because any violation of peremptory norms of
international law must be prevented or terminated. Furthermore, there must be prevention
of any debt used against the interest of the people, whether it was with the knowledge of
the lender and/or the borrower or not. Hence, there are two scenarios: the first scenario is
when the money does not transfer to the borrower; there is no obligation to the lender,
who can prevent the transfer of money to the borrower without any sanctions. In the
second scenario, the money has been transferred to the borrower, but did not been used
for odious purposes. In this case, it is the right of the lender to demand the return of the
money from the borrower because it will be used against the borrower’s citizens’ benefit
or for odious purposes. This is due to the inaccurate knowledge of the lender at the time
of signing the contract, in this case, the purpose in which the borrower will use the debt.83
c. The creditor awareness that debt is odious.
The idea that creditors must be aware of the debt is mentioned by most authors.
Generally, it is the right of the borrower to get the debt from the state, either after war,
revolution, succession, or the peaceful evolution of societies, unless otherwise agreed
to.84 According to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, “The passing of State debts
entails the extinction of the obligations of the Predecessor State and the arising of the
obligations of the Successor State in respect of the State debts which pass to the
Successor State, subject to the provisions of the articles in the present Part.”85 Moreover
article 36 of the convention states “A succession of States does not as such affect the
rights and obligations of creditors.”86 In contrast, the knowledge of the lender that debt is
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odious prevents the bearing of the obligation by the successor state, particularly in
returning the debt.
The gravity of this condition is controversial among scholars, especially from the side
of defenders of the lending party. Some scholars do not hold the lender responsible. For
example, Wolfowitz does not hold the World Bank responsible.87 He contends that the
World Bank does not have any responsibility to know for what purposes a debt will be
used for.88 He said that Iraq debt has been used to “buy weapons and to build palaces and
to build instruments of oppression,”89 and the debt has to be cancelled not on the odious
ground, rather for reasons of debt sustainability.90 He differentiates between international
lending and domestic lending. In the first situation, there is no responsibility on the
lender. However, in domestic lending, total responsibility is on the lender, who has no
responsibility to get back the money, which is illegitimate. He assumes trust between
countries, and that a lender should not look to the past when dealing with corrupt or
odious debt, rather to look to the future only. A lender may learn the corruption of the
borrower who governs other countries, but it “really could not talk about the word in
public.”91 This may be based on the idea that it is prohibited to interfere in the internal
affairs of other states.
On the other hand, other scholars believe those creditors are totally responsible for
such debt if they knew its hateful nature. Lenders providing loans to regimes, which they
know there corrupt, help in their corruption. After that, they return to talk on democracy
and oblige citizens of those countries to pay the price of corruption.92 Wolfowitz and the
87
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broadened past debasement, to political loaning by the Worldbank expected to back a cool war associate of
the United States. The point when Suharto movedmillions of Javanese individuals to populate different
islands in the "transmigration" program(including huge numbers of the civilian army parts who battled
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supporters of the lenders cannot avoid responsibility by “saying they have no
responsibility or liability for past improper lending, and they are only willing to consider
the narrow question of corruption.”93 The error of the defenders of the non-responsibility
of the lenders is that they treat international debt like the internal debt.94 In domestic
loans, the lender must make sure of the capacity of the borrower to repay the debt. For
example, British law requires banks to “respect the ordinary principles of fair dealing"95
and must assess that borrower's "age, experience, business capacity and state of
health.”96Of course, this is different from international loans; if it is reasonable to ask
banks in domestic lending situations to be sure of the possibility of a person to pay off
their debts, this cannot be a requirement of international banks that commonly help poor
countries and people most in need. Consequently, there is a role in the international
lending community to help borrowing countries, even if they are not able to fulfill their
obligations, to be sure that the money will be used fairly.
Omri Ben-Shahar and Mitu Gulati say that the party best placed to prevent the
accumulation of odious debt is a party who should bear the cost of that debt.
Accordingly, even if the population has benefited from part of those debts, the creditors
must share the responsibility for the rest of the debt that is not beneficial reflecting
relative blameworthiness and benefits of each.97 It is the role of international institution to
determine the extent of the benefit of each part and the creditor to be aware of the odious
nature of such debt.

against East Timor's independence),despite protestations about human rights and natural issues, the World
Bankprovided almost $1 billion in loans.1° Many of the transients were put on negligible area where they
couldn't survive, so the World Bank loaned more cash to attempt to back them. The transmigration program
was as of now being executed, and the World Bank was as of now making new credits for it, while
Wolfowitz was minister there. In this manner Indonesia undertakes an extremely uncommon put in any
exchange of Wolfowitz's anticorruption extend in the World Bank. Not just does the World Bank not have
clean hands, yet Wolfowitz has individual learning of World Bank complicity in defilement. Yet his World
Bank is attempting to gather on those illegitimate and degenerate advances.”
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However, this role of international bodies is not suitable in all cases, especially when
the creditor is one of the international institutions and aware of the odious nature of the
debt. This is appearing in the case of the Congo during the 1960s:
In 1965 General Joseph Mobutu took power in the Congo (which he
renamed Zaire). Mobutu became one of the world’s most corrupt dictators.
In 1978 the IMF appointed its own man, Irwin Blumenthal, to a key post in
the central bank of Zaire. He resigned in less than a year, writing a memo
which said that corruption was so serious that there was ‘no (repeat no)
prospect for Zaire’s creditors to get their money back’.19 Shortly afterwards,
the IMF granted Zaire the largest loan it had ever given an African country;
over the next decade it gave Mobuto $700 million. Zaire had virtually
stopped repaying its debts in 1982, but in the next decade the World Bank
lent $2 billion to Zaire. Western governments were the biggest lenders, and
continued to pour in new money. When Blumenthal wrote his report, Zaire’s
debt was $4.6 billion. When Mobuto was overthrown and died in 1998, the
debt was $12.9 billion98
Although the IMF sent a representative who wrote a report on the extent of corruption
that exists in Zaire and the impossibility of returning such money, the IMF continued to
lend money. The IMF and other shareholders are not fit to determine the liability because
in most cases they are the lenders. There is a conflict of interest. The UN Conference on
Trade and Development emphasized that the IMF “is not a neutral body and cannot,
therefore, be expected to act as independent arbiter.”99 The creation of a special court
independent from international funding agencies, and which have the ability to identify
the liability of the creditor and the amount of such liability is indicated.
3. Regime Debt
As a general principle in international law, and in normal situations governments adhere
to commitments with financial obligations incurred by previous governments. " [c]hanges
in the government or internal policy of the state do not as a rule affect its position in
international law[;] though the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and
obligations unimpaired.“100 A change of a government does not alter the rights and
obligations incurred by previous governments, and as a general principle, the successor
98
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governments adhere to commitments made by the prior government. This based on the
fact that international relations are built on stability and a mere changing of governments
is not enough, in itself, to end obligations and terminate rights.
The succession of a government means just a change at the head of government or
even, at most a change in the ruling regime of the state, but this does not affect the legal
personality of the state. There are illustrations:
[t]he dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the unification of Germany are examples of
state and not government succession. By comparison, the regime changes in
Afghanistan and Iraq in the twenty-first century are examples of government and
not state succession. Pursuant to a positivistic international law rule, a successor
government is always responsible for the debts of its predecessor government.101
In fact, some scholars, like Ian Brownlie, claim that international law recognizes only
states not governments. Even if the debt was incurred by the government to act, the state
is still responsible for such debts.102 This is based on the fact that the officials incurred
debts on behalf of the state. Thus, any change in the government does not affect the
identity of the state that is still responsible for such debts. This claim may be true, but it
has not considered revolutions103 of one of the conditions for the termination of
obligations.
The change of government may not be achieved normally, but in a revolutionary way.
After changing the political regime in a country, not the government alone but the system
as a whole through a revolution or secession, the country may question the extent of its
commitment to implement contracts signed by the previous regime and the extent of
mandatory debt arising from those contracts. For instance, on December 22, 1792 after
the French revolution, France refused to pay the debt of the previous regime under the
claim that “sovereignty of peoples is not bound by the treaties of tyrants."104 After
negotiation, it consented paying only one- third of the debt. Moreover, in 1918, the Soviet
government issued a decree annulling all foreign loans contracted under the Czarist and
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Kerensky governments. The Soviets stated “Governments and systems that spring from
revolution are not bound to respect the obligations of fallen governments.”105
For that reason, debt is odious when there is an absence of popular consent, absence
of the benefit, and the creditor is aware of these two elements. “It may be said that all
odious debts are regime debts, whereas not all regime debts are odious debts.”106
Accordingly, successor regimes are responsible for ordinary debt resulting from a legal
manner from the predecessor regimes, but they may not be responsible for odious debt.
The government after political transition argues that they form a new state, which is
totally independent of the predecessor state. The former treaties are concluded without an
intention or interference from the revolutionary leaders; the revolutionary leaders have no
role in concluding any prior treaties. These treaties may be one of the causes of such
revaluation. Thus, the revolutionary leaders come with a policy different from the
predecessor's policy, and repudiate the authority that concluded such treaties.107
A revolution or an unconstitutional change in the system of governance is not
sufficient to get rid of the debt, as there must be odious or illegitimate use of those funds
to consider the debt odious. William H. Taft explained in the Tinoco Arbitration case,108
the case that was raised to determine the extent of the responsibility of states for the debt
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resulting from succession, that the disputed transactions were for personal interests and
not for the public interest and it could not be implemented. The tribunal stated that the
debt could be implemented because the bank failed to prove that the debt is for legitimate
government use.
The change by revolution upsets the rule of the authorities in power
under the existing fundamental law, and sets aside the fundamental law
in so far as the change of rule makes it necessary.... The same
government continues internationally, but not the internal law of its
being.109
Predecessor regime can get rid of the debt arising from the corrupt regimes even if there
has been no change in the state.110 “The bank knew that this money was to be used by the
retiring president, F. Tinoco, for his personal support after he had taken refuge in a
foreign country.”111
In addition to political transition, changed circumstances may be the cornerstone for
the dropping of odious debt after a revolution. A change of the circumstances is sufficient
for the application of the maxim rebus sic stantibus. For example, the change of
circumstances in the Republic of South Africa allowed it to approve all acts before
independence. The Republic of South Africa gained its independence from Britain in
1934, and in 1994 South Africa gained its independence from the white minority
rule.112The identity of South Africa did not chang after independence, but the change of
circumstance has allowed the state to drop the debt that not complies with the provision
of the new constitution. It is the right of the parliament to reject debt that is concluded
according to the previous constitution. Article 231(1) of the South African constitution
states that:
All rights and obligations under international agreements which immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution were vested in or binding on the
Republic within the meaning of the previous Constitution, shall be vested in or
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binding on the Republic under this Constitution, unless provided otherwise byan
Act of Parliament113
In short, revolution is considered an implied cause for the termination of odious debt;
there is no need for a change of the identity of the state. Revolution is an emergency
situation that affects the will of one of the contracting parties. The termination of treaties
according to revolutionary conditions is based on two criteria: “a radical change in
national policies and identity, and the lack of "legal continuity" between the old and the
revolutionary regimes usually accompanying such policy upheavals.”114 The legal
discontinuity occurs when there is a change of the powers of the state.
The Next chapter looks at the legal grounds to cannel odious debt based on
international law. The chapter divided into three parts The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (1969), the peace treaties, particularly the Versailles Treaty (1919) and
the peace treaty between France and Italy, and the general principles of international law.
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III.

Legal Grounds to Cancel Odious Debts

This chapter explores the normative basis for repudiating odious debts in international
law. The parties to a contract are bound by it according to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda; this international principle contradicts the odious debts theory. Accordingly, it
is important to determine the legal basis that could justify repudiating odious debts
Scholars of international law depend on Article 38 of the International Court of Justice to
determine the sources of international law. They are four sources:
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.115
Treaties are the agreements concluded by sovereign states and may use different
names such as; protocol, agreement, or charter.116 Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as any “agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”117
The parties to a treaty are bound by it according to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. However, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not absolute. pacta sunt
servanda does not mean such unduly rigid and formal principle that a state should abide
by in all circumstances regardless of the contract content, and no matter how severely
circumstances have changed. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is not absolute
whenever the existence of a severe threat to the existence of the state and its performance.
The change in circumstances and conditions gives the state a right to review its
contractual.118
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It is wrong to suppose that pacta sunt servanda must apply tout court in all cases
or in none. No mature law of contract is absolute, and few principles of law are to
be understood without qualification. The undoubted fact that there exist cases
where a State is entitled to change a contractual relationship with an alien does
not mean that the principle pacta sunt servanda is altogether inapplicable to State
contracts.119
On the other hand, treaties require host states to accord fair and equitable treatment to
the other contracting state. For instance the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on
Investments Abroad (Abs and Shawcross, 1960) and the Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property (the OECD Draft Convention) proposed by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1967 (OECD,
1967) provid for fair and equitable treatment as the basic protection for foreign
investors.120 It is difficult to reduce the words fair and equitable treatment to a precise
statement of all legal obligations. They grant considerable discretion to tribunals to
review the fairness and equity of government actions in light of all facts and
circumstances of the case without necessarily deliberating on the requirements of either
national or international law.121
The tribunal in Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED SA v United Mexican States
concluded that equitable treatment requires the contracting parties not to act against the
basic expectation of the other party:
The fair and equitable provision of the agreement in the light of the demands of
good faith required by international law requires the contracting parties to the
agreement to accord a treatment to foreign investment that does not go against the
basic expectation on the basis of which the foreign investor decided to make the
investment.122
In order to qualify for protection, the investor’s expectation must be reasonable be based
on the conduct of the state and reliance by the investor in making the investment. In
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determining the fair expectation of the other party the tribunal In LG&E Energy Corp.v
Argentina held that fair expectation of the contracting parties must be achieved:
The investor’s fair expectation have the following characteristics: they are based
on the conditions offered by the host state at the time of the investment; they may
not be established unilaterally by one of the parties; they must exist and be
enforceable by law; in the event of infringement by the host state, a duty to
compensate the investor for damages arises except for those caused in the event of
state of necessity123
Fair expectation is based on the moral and legal standards that contracts must be
respected. There is a duty to respect the legitimate expectation of the other party. The
parties to the contractual relationship are barred from taking any action that would affect
the legitimate expectations of the other party. To improve the investment process in any
country, there must be legal protection for other countries and their investors.
The second source of international law is customary international law. Most of the
rules of international law are customary rules that are codified later in the framework of
international treaties. Customary rules to be formed, “not only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive
necessitat.”124 Either the states taking such action or other states in a reaction to it, must
have behaved in a manner that their conduct is sufficiently observable. Scholars of
international law establish custom as a source of international law on two pillars; there
must be a widespread and uniform practice of nations, and an engagement in the practice
out of a sense of legal obligation.125
As mentioned above, according to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, the general principles of law is one of the primary sources of international law.
Those principles are common to all legal systems. There are different examples of those
principles such as, the principle of enforcing contracts or commitments in good faith, the
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principle of responsibility in the event of a breach in obligations, the principle of nonabuse of the right, and the principle of the invalidity of legal acts to the lack of the will.126
In addition, judicial decision and juristic writings are a source of international law.
The decisions of international and municipal courts and the publications of academics can
be referred to as a means of recognizing the law established in other sources. Courts and
tribunals can refer to their past decisions and advisory opinions to support their
explanation of a present case. Moreover, the scholarly works of prominent thinkers are
essential in developing the rules that are provided for in other sources.
A. The Legal Basis for Repudiating Odious Debts in the Law of Treaties
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes general rules to govern all
international treaties. It also codifies the reasons and the legal basis for the invalidating
international agreements.
1. General rules
Each state has an international personality which presupposes its capability to bear
international rights and obligations. Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties affirms that “Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.”127 A state
must express its free consent to be bound by the treaty. The capacity to conclude treaties
is an essential attributes of states. Once a territorial entity is recognized as a state, it
essentially implies an acceptance by the entire community of states of its ability to
conclude treaties.128
The consent of the state can be shown in various manners. According to article 11 of
the VCLT “The consent of a state to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature,
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”129 There are no required forms to express
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consent; a state can express its consent in any form. States can freely express consent to
conclude treaties as long as they respect preemptory norms of international law.130
Parties must observe their agreements. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties refers to one of the most essential legal bases for commitment to
agreements. Article 26 of VCLT provides that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”131 Pacta sunt servanda is the
key element for observing agreements in international law. It creates an obligation on a
state to follow what it signed.132According to the same article, the parties should not only
abide by the provisions of the treaty, but also implement its provisions in good faith. For
settling disputes arising between state parties, there must be a determination as to whether
the parties acted in good faith or not. The ICJ interprets Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention: “[t]he purpose of the Treaty, and the intentions of the [P]arties in concluding
it … should prevail over its literal application. The principle of good faith obliges the
[P]arties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be
realized.”133
Good faith is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning can be understood from
various perspectives. Good faith can be achieved under the following conditions;
"honesty in belief or purpose, absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable
advantage, and in a general approach it denotes faithfulness to one's duty or obligation or
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or
business."134 O'Connor proposes that the principle of good faith is of a fundamental
importance that must be achieved:
The principle of good faith in international law is a fundamental principle from
which the rule Pacta Sunt Servanda and other legal rules distinctively and directly
relate to honesty, fairness and reasonableness are derived, and the application of
these rules is determined at any particular time by the compelling standards of
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honesty, fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the international community at
that time.135
Good faith is evidence that states must respect each other's sincerity and without any kind
of deception. Each party to the contract is committed to fulfilling his obligations without
causing any frustration to the terms of the contract. A state must implement its obligation
honestly and with integrity. The term honestly, which entails an obligation be performed
by a state, is ambiguous, yet this ambiguity can be removed by tracing government
measures designed to implement those commitments and whether they are compatible
with international law or not.
The principle pacta sunt servanda does not stop at the limit of the contract parties to
the treaty, but beyond to any other third party within the limits of their rights and duties:
Pacta sunt servanda was emphasized in both the cases of the German unification
and the Yugoslav dissolution in agreement with the Vienna Treaties. In the case
of the German unification, debts and assets transferred to the federal government
in accordance with pacta sunt servanda and the Unification Treaty. During the
Yugoslav dissolution, the Bandinter Commission ruled that debts and assets must
be distributed equally following bona fide negotiations between the successor
states and their creditors136
A manifest violation of internal law is recognized if it would be objectively evident to
any state:
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. A violation is
manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the
matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.137
Each state has the right to determine the organs and procedures by which its consent to be
bound by a treaty is expressed. On the other side, there is a risk to the stability of
international relations if they rely only on the domestic law of the state. Hence, when
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there is a manifest violation of the internal law of the state, this violation must be taken
into consideration to terminate the treaty.138
2. Manifest Violation
The state can reverse the consent to be bound by the treaty if the violation is manifest
and has fundamental importance. This is based on the fact that good faith refers to both
the justification for and the limits of the principle of ostensible authority.139 If the
violation is manifest, the other party has to know that the representative of the state acted
wrongfully. The other contracting party cannot claim that it acted on good faith according
to the proper authority of the representative, since the violation was against fundamental
importance and manifest.140
The rules which the violation invokes must be of fundamental importance. Violations
affect minor legal principles and administrative rules are not considered of fundamental
importance.141 There must be a violation of fundamental rules such as constitutional
provisions.142 An example of fundamental importance was set by the ICJ court in the case
of Land and Maritime Boundary Cameroon v. Nigeria. The court held that “[t]he rules
concerning the authority to sign treaties for a State are constitutional rules of fundamental
importance.”143 This statement does not mean that each provision relating to the
competence of concluding treaties is of fundamental importance. The rule concerning the
authority to sign treaties that was invoked by Nigeria qualifies as a constitutional rule in
the substantive matter and is of fundamental importance since it invokes the right of the
government to be involved in the conclusion of treaties by the head of State.144
In addition to the violation against a fundamental principle, it must be manifest.145 The
state must act in good faith. The principle’s good faith allows the state to invoke the
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violation committed against its internal law. Good faith is used in a variety of contexts,
and its meaning can be understood from different perspectives. Hence, when the other
contracting state ought to know the violation, it is considered manifest. For instance, the
violation is considered manifest if the representative of the state lacks the authority. In
that case, the lack of the authority must easily be known to the other party. 146
3. Fraud
Fraud is another matter that affects the consent of the state and can lead to the
termination of a treaty; it is the antithesis of good faith.147 Article 49 of the VCLT
provides that “If a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct
of another negotiating State, the State may invoke fraud as invalidating its consent to be
bound by the treaty.”148 a state contracting under fraud with another country, has the right
to get rid of its obligations arising from the contract. Fraud not only affects the consent,
but the agreement itself. It destroys the foundation of trust between the contracting
parties.149 The condition of fraud, to be sufficient for invalidating consent, is different
from one national law to another, but the general principle is that fraud is able ground
accepted for invalidating agreements by the international community.150
A treaty is void if there is a fraudulent behavior by one state that influenced the other
country to conclude it. A causal relationship must exist between the fraudulent conduct
and conclusion of contract. The conduct is fraudulent “if it is intended to lead the other
party into error and thereby gain an advantage to the detriment of the other party.”151 Two
elements must be achieved to consider a conduct fraudulent: intent by the defrauding
state, and an error from the defrauded state. A state commits a fraud when it leads another
state into an error that forces the latter to conclude the agreement. The intent is the key
element in the fraud. Fraud which results in a contracting error occurs through
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misrepresentation. Misrepresentation is an impression created in mind of the
representative of the defrauded state not in accord with reality whether explicitly or
implicitly. Concealment or non-disclosure of information is one of the elements of
misrepresentation. Although there is no duty to provide all information, the principle of
good faith requires parties to provide all of the information they have. 152
Fraud and misrepresentation should not only exist at the end of the misrepresentation
of opinion or law, but extent to the misrepresentation of fact. Article 49 of the VCLT
does not explicitly state the reasons for the invalidity of the treaty in the case of
misrepresentation of facts. The misrepresentation of the opinion or the law requires, of
course, misrepresentation of facts. Article 49 does not only include the freedom to
consent, but goes beyond to a sanction for bad faith committed by a defrauding party.
Intention is the main element to prove fraud. Innocent misrepresentation or negligence
does not constitute fraud even if it leads the other party to consent to the agreement. 153
Fraud does not only affect the mutual consent of the contracting parties, but also
destroys the entire relationship and the mutual confidence between the contracting
parties. If a fraudulent conduct affects a clause in the agreement, the defrauded state can
choose either invalidating the clause or the entire agreement. Here, the defrauding party
is not entitled to demand the re-establishment of the status quo ante. This is due to the full
bad faith through using fraudulent methods to convince the other party to agree.154
4. Corruption
Beside the fraud that may occur and lead to invalidating treaties, the corruption of a
state’s representative is a major reason for invalidating treaties. Article 50 of the VCLT
provides that “If the expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty has been
procured through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another
negotiating State, the State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be
bound by the treaty.”155 The main purpose of the article is to maintain the freedom of
consent of the contracting state in the case of corruption of its representative. Contractual
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obligations expressed by a state representative through corruption do not represent the
true will of the state. In fact, the representative of the State reflects the will of the
corrupting state not the will of his state.
There are many forms of corruption. Today, in the international community,
corruption may be based on the abuse or entrusted power of a public officer for private
profit. Also, corruption may be expressed in a promise, offer or provision of favors and
gifts presented to the representative of the other party to obtain personal benefits in
return. Corruption represented in that article is that corruption that leads state
representatives to seek approval to conclude the agreement for personal profit, which
he/she would otherwise not have given. A direct benefit is not required; an indirect
benefit is also considered corruption.156 There is no required form of the gain of the
benefit. The gain may be pecuniary or non-pecuniary. The promise of a particular
position for the representative of the state is a kind of corruption. On the other hand, mini
gifts to maintain good relations between the countries do not live up to the level of
corruption.157 There must be a direct relation between the profit gained and the
conclusion of the agreement. Intention to influence the will of the representative of the
State is the key element for proving corruption.158
There must be a causal relationship between the corruption of the representative and
the expression of consent. It does not require that the impact of corruption affect any
clause of the contract to render the agreement voidable.159 The mere existence of
corruption of the representative of the state makes the agreement voidable.160
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5. Coercion
Corruption of the representative of the State is not the only reason for invalidating an
agreement; the coercion of the state representative is a further reason to invalidate the
agreement. An agreement concluded under coercion or a threat of state representative is
void. Article 51 of the VCLT provides that “The expression of a State’s consent to be
bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through
acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect.”161 There is no free
will under coercion; the representative of the state is an instrument in the hand of the
coercing state and in expressing its will. Coercion may be defined as “the procurement of
consent through acts or threats, which induce such fear in the representative, which he or
she feels compelled to express the represented State’s consent to be bound by the treaty
in a manner which he or she would not have done without such compulsion.”162 Hence,
there must be an act of coercion directed against the representative of the state. In most
cases, the coercion is mental not physical, yet both of them are accepted as a threat
against the representative. 163
Any form of objection which does not include the use of force or threat of use is not
considered coercion. The use of veto in any form does not mean coercion against the
other party. This can be seen in the the Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration:
Of course, this does not mean that some pressure may not have been brought to
bear upon the Rulers in order to secure their consent to the delimitations of the
boundaries. Every kind of international negotiation is subject to influences of this
kind. Mere influences and pressures cannot be equated with the concept of
coercion as it is known in international law.164
The coercion must be against the personality of the representative. This happenes if the
coercion is against one’s life, physical well-being or reputation. Coercion does not
require being directly against the representative of the State. Any coercion against a
person closely related to the representative of the State such as coercion against a
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member of his family is sufficient. In all cases there must be a causal relationship
between the act of coercion and the signing of the agreement. The consent of the state
after the coercion of its representative is void. The invalidity affects the whole agreement
not only specific clauses even if the coercion is against specific clauses. 165
Coercion against the representative as an official is a coercion against the state.
Furthermore, coercion happening after the signing of a treaty is coercion against the state.
Any coercion exists in a ratification process or any process after signing the agreement is
coercion against the state. Article 52 of the VCLT provides that “A treaty is void if its
conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”166 The treaty is void if
there is a threat or use of force against a state party to that treaty. The nonexistence of
free consent from an organ of the state or the representative of the state as an official
person leads to the invalidity of the treaty. The entire treaty is void even if the coercion is
for a certain cause. The oppressed state can claim the invalidity of the entire state if there
is a threat or use of force against any of its organs. This can be seen in Lockerbie and
Libya citing of art 52 of the Vienna Convention:
The principle of the prohibition of force set out, inter alia, in Article 52 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning the conclusion of
treaties, and therefore force with respect to the conclusion of treaties, applies
equally to their performance. If, as Article 26 of this Convention stipulates,
‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith’, this provision – Article 26 – is a fortiori violated when a
States Parties to a convention resorts to threats in order to force the other
contracting party to renounce its rights under that Convention.167
There must be a causal relationship between force and the conclusion of a treaty.
Unlawful force is required to invalidate the agreement. A treaty between Germany and
Czechoslovak was void as a result of the use of force the Dutch District Court of The
Hague stated in 1955: “The German-Czechoslovakia Nationality Treaty was invalid
because it was concluded under clear and unlawful duress – the effect of which
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Czechoslovakia could not escape – exercised by Germany.”168 Accordingly, there must
be coercion and a use of force to conclude the treaty. This use of force must be clear and
the treating party must intend to use such force to conclude the treaty. There is no degree
of force in international relations; a powerful state can impact another state with any act
that affects its consent to conclude a treaty.169
There are multiple ways for the use of force by the big power; the mere threat of force
by the major powers against a small state may be sufficient in itself to consider the
occurrence of coercion on the will of the state. In international relations, just sending
threatening messages from a major state or use force against smallest countries is enough
for the occurrence of coercion. In all cases, there must be proof of coercive intent against
the consent of the state.
B. Peace treaties
Although the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts has not yet come into force, it is considered a source for the
determination of the debt arising from the state succession. Article 8 of the treaty defines
state property as “property, rights and interests which, at the date of the succession of
States, were, according to the internal law of the Predecessor State, owned by that
State.”170 The purpose of that article is not merely to identify state property, but also to
set standards for the properties of the state after succession. Each case difference from
one to another and the circumstances of the case determines the property of the
predecessor state. International customary law does not specify the meaning of the
property of the predecessor state. The Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission171
provided that, "customary international law has not established any autonomous criterion
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for determining what constitutes State property."172 International treaty law has
consequently taken precautions against this inevitable deficiency and provided a special
definition suitable to each case dealt with.173 Accordingly, the internal law of the
predecessor state is used to determine the property of the successor state. To prevent the
control of the predecessor state of the property of the successor state, the latter has the
right of the position and concept of the property according to the limit of international
law. The successor state considered here is an independent state with total sovereignty
not a successor state.
State property is passed from the predecessor state to the successor state with the
extension of all rights and duties. The successor state exercises all rights over the
property within the territory of the new state. The Treaty of Versailles expresses an idea
about state property in an article which specifies that "Powers to which German territory
is ceded shall acquire all property and possessions situated therein belonging to the
German Empire or to the German States.”174 The date of passing state property is
determined from the day of succession unless otherwise agreed upon. The date of
succession means according to Article 2 of the convention “the date upon which the
successor state replaced the predecessor state in the responsibility for the international
relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates.” State debt is an issue
transferred according to the succession of the state. Article 33 of the Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts defined state
debt as “any financial obligation of a predecessor State arising in conformity with
international law towards another State, an international organization or any other subject
of international law.”175
The above is the main basis for the transfer of debts, obligations and rights to the
successor states. However, in the peace treaties specifically, successor states may be
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exempted from debts concluded by predecessor states. War debts are definitely one of the
categories of odious debts. Peace treaties that have been approved after World War I
expanded the concept of war debts. This expansion includes all debts incurred by the
states during the war, as well as those debts contracted during the war. Expansion here
was inevitable in order to exempt the successor states from the debt that was incurred
during the war. Under the Versailles Treaty, “Denmark which had succeeded to
Schleswig after the separation of that territory from Germany had been exempted from
the war debts of the German Empire, although it had remained neutral during the 19141918 war.”176 Article 255 states exceptions to the main principle, ruling the transfer of
public debts of the predecessor state. It provides that
(1) As an exception to the above provision and inasmuch as in 1871 Germany
refused to undertake any portion of the burden of the French debt, France shall be,
in respect of Alsace-Lorraine, exempt from any payment under Article 254.
(2) In the case of Poland that portion of the debt which, in the opinion of the
Reparation Commission, is attributable to the measures taken by the German and
Prussian Governments for the German colonisation of Poland shall be excluded
from the apportionment to be made under Article 254.
(3) In the case of all ceded territories other than Alsace- Lorraine, that portion of
the debt of the German Empire or German States which, in the opinion of the
Reparation Commission, represents expenditure by the Governments of the
German Empire or States upon the Government properties referred to in Article
256 shall be excluded from the apportionment to be made under Article 254177
Hence, any debt concluded for the war or subjugation is not mandatory for the successor
state. The Versailles Treaty exempted Poland from debt contracted by Germany for the
purpose of economic subjugation of Poles. The treaty exempted Poland because Germany
contracted the loan for exercising its power over Poland as a dominion.
The extension of the meaning of war debt extends to World War II. The Peace treaty
between France and Italy provided that Ethiopia does not have to bear any part of the
debt undertaken by Italy during the period of occupation in order to increase its colonial
control. The colonial powers in that period contracted with the World Bank for huge
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loans to increase their colonial control.178 The World Bank generously lends those
countries to increase their colonial abilities. The lending of such money is to ensure the
continuation of colonial policy and of course without the consent of the colonized states.
The Italian Treaty provides:
The Government of the Successor State shall be exempt from the payment of the
Italian public debt, but will assume the obligations of the Italian State towards
holders who continue to reside in the ceded territory, or who, being juridical
persons, retain their siège social or principal place of business there, in so far as
these obligations correspond to that portion of this debt which has been issued
prior to June 10, 1940, and is attributable to public works and civil administrative
services of benefit to the said territory but not attributable directly or indirectly to
military purposes. 179
In short, debt concluded for the war or subjugation is not obligatory for the successor
state. The successor state is exempt from the payment of such debt.
C. The Normative Basis of the Doctrine of Odious Debts in International
Human Rights Law
Mohammed Bedjaoui defines odious debt as “any debt incurred for uses that contradict
contemporary international law, particularly the principles of international law
incorporated in the UN Charter.” Those principles of international law are such as those
included in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the two complementing covenants on civil and political rights and economic,
social and cultural rights of 1966, as well the peremptory norms of international law.
Human rights must be respected, and most treaties provide for the protection of
human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights180 as an international
instrument defines the basic human rights. Article 28 provides that "everyone is entitled
to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
declaration cannot be to be fully realized…the elimination of unjust systems is a
prerequisite for human rights and fundamental freedoms to be realized."181 There must be
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a protection of all forms of human rights. One of these protections is to guard citizens
from odious regimes. Supporting citizens to revolt and separate from the odious regime is
an international duty. It is vital to end all odious regimes.
Toppling the regime alone is not enough, but must also cancel all illicit and odious
debt originating from the rule of this regime. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights182 provides that each state "undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic
and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures."183 These duties are universal,
both in terms of ethical, and law, and cannot be subject to the loan contract, which is
illegal. In short, the state has an obligation to save and protect human rights as an
international obligation which prevails over its previous contractual duties signed by an
odious regime.
D. Odious Debts and International Public Policy
A treaty which is against public policy is illegitimate and unenforceable. This treaty is
unenforceable for both parties whether or not both or one of them are aware of such
violation. The court in Oom v Bruce asserts that the insurance contract will be
unenforceable for both parties because the insurance was concluded for the enemy after
the declaration of the war. Although both parties were not aware at the time of
concluding the contract, the war had been declared. Lord Ellenborough CJ said that “the
plaintiffs had no knowledge of the commencement of hostilities by Russia, when they
affected this insurance; and, therefore, no fault is imputable to them for entering into the
contract; and there is no reason why they should not recover back the premiums which
they have paid.”184
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The mere knowledge of one party that an illegal act will be committed is sufficient for
nullification of the contract. In Langton v Hughe, a defendant sold the plaintiff goods
with the knowledge of their use for making beer. Although there is a statute in the
contract prohibiting beer making, the knowledge of the defendant that goods will be used
in an illegal act is sufficient for not recovering the goods. There must be knowledge that
there is illegal activity committed. Mere knowledge may be insufficient for uncovering
the money or goods. The knowledge of the parties about illegal activities is subject to the
discretion of the court. The innocent party should bring the contract to an end when
he/she knows the existence of the offense even if part of the duty is completed. He/she
can demand their rights on the part completed.
Any contract against public order should not gain legal support. Lord Mansfield in
Holman v Johnson stated that
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for
his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say. The
principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No Court will
lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal
act. If, from the plaintiff’s own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to
arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there
the Court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes;
not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a
plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant
was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the
advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault, potior est conditio
defendentis.185
Odious debts violate international public policy. It is almost implausible for any court
to deny that odious debt as a form of corruption contravenes international public policy.
Judge Lagergren in ICC Case No. 1110 (1963) provided that "corruption is an
international evil; it is contrary to good morals and to an international public policy
common to the community of nations."186Most legal systems distinguish between two
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types of contracts: those procured by corruption, and those that provide the basis for
corruption. The first contract is considered voidable, and the last is a null and void
contract. The contract that provides the basis for corruption is null and void because there
is an intention to commit corrupt acts. The Paris Court of Appeal in Westman recognized
that "[a] contract having as its aim and object a traffic in influence through the payment
of bribes is… contrary to French international public policy as well as to the ethics of
international commerce as understood by the large majority of States in the international
community."187 It is commonly known that odious debts are committed intentionally
against the benefit of the citizens and with the knowledge of both parties. Accordingly,
there is no need for a step by any party to consider the contract null and void. The court
has the right not to enforce the contract or provide for any contractual remedies.188 In
short, any breach of international public policy voids a contract.

IV.

Conclusion

This research reviews various aspects of the doctrine of odious debts. The purpose is to
draw attention to key areas of disagreement about the status of the doctrine, particularly
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the definition, and the international legal grounds supporting such a definition. In another
version of the scenario sketched at the outset of this article, the doctrine of odious debt is
an exception to the rule of repayment. The development of the concept was influenced by
the origins of scholarly treatment of odious debts by Sack, Feilchenfeld, Howse and
Bedjaoui. Through a review of their opinions, the conclusion is that odious debts arise
without the consent of the population, without benefit to them, and with the knowledge of
the creditor. Scholars are aware that odious debt is not required to be apportioned after
political transitions. Although, odious debt doctrine has difficulty being applied in
government succession, there is a little authority for the doctrine’s application in cases of
government succession. There is no change in the identity of the state, but the change of
the circumstances must be taken into consideration. The change in circumstances such as
a revolution is sufficient to apply the doctrine of odious debt.
The sources of international law support the existence of such a doctrine. There are
various international treaties relevant for the odious debt doctrine. Though, it should be
noted that throughout history states have not openly acknowledged that they apply odious
debt doctrine by name. The term odious debt is merely a label used to reflect a debt
committed under three main conditions which are absence of benefit, consent, and
creditor awareness of both to be an exception to the rule of repayment. Accordingly, this
research focused on the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties and peace treaties as
international grounds for cancelling odious debt. Although consent is the cornerstone of
international relations, there are certain cases where a debt committed under consent is
consider odious. If the violation is manifest, the other party must know that the
representative of the state acted wrongfully. Moreover, general principles of law such as
abuse of rights, equitable obligations and defenses, and violation of human rights and
public policy show qualified promise as sources for an odious debt exception to the rule
of repayment.
The final conclusion from all of this is that the doctrine of odious debt has a diverse
pedigree, but supporters have based their claims on a considerable number of legal bases.
It is hoped that this article has simplified the terms of the debate and highlighted
remaining areas of difference. Whether the doctrine as conventionally considered or as
50

reaffirmed by various authors will ultimately be recognized in cases of state and
government succession remains to be seen. The reality is that it is beyond any
commentator’s doubt that odious debts are morally odious.
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